Countering Moral Relativism

By: Joshua Copeland

To counter moral relativism, we turn to moral objectivity, a doctrine that emphasizes the existence of singular moral truths and values. Two points of note. First, moral objectivity is not an intolerant approach to ethics. Second, to hold all individuals and cultures to a given moral framework does not forgo compassion. Aside from highlighting specific alternatives to moral relativism, having a clear comprehension of moral relativism and its fallacies (both logical and practical) is an equally powerful means to counter this approach.

Moral relativism holds that no one moral view is objectively privileged as the moral truth, and moral right and wrong are relative rather than absolute. Moral relativism implies that no individual, society or culture possesses the grounds to ethically dispute the moral rightness of practices or beliefs held by others. Moral judgements can only be judged as true or false relative to the framework within which they occur.

This article expounds further on moral relativism discussions by Seven Pillars Institute (SPI) on the matter.

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism is an approach to ethics whereby value judgements are only true according to some relative standard or framework. The controversy surrounding moral relativism relates to the proposition that no single framework can be shown as objectively right or above the rest. Levy (16) gives a pair of useful and concise theses to understand the tenets of moral relativism:

1. Moral claims are true only relative to some standard or framework.
2. This standard or framework is not itself uniquely justified.

It is also important to understand the scales that govern judgements, which can be understood as being relative to either[1]:

1. The individual
2. A culture or society

Moral truths can be derived from either the opinions of an individual, or the culture and practices of a society. Thus, this implies the beliefs of an individual, or cultural practices of a society can never be labelled as morally wrong because the truth of moral statements are derived by reference to individual opinion or the standards of a culture respectively. Truth is defined relatively to each framework, and not objectively by an absolute moral code.

The Problem with Moral Relativism

The most pervasive form of moral relativism occurs as cultural metaethical relativism, an approach to ethics which incorrectly derives the nonexistence of objective morality or truth from cultural disagreement. To understand how this occurs, it helps to break down and analyse the general line of logic which is pushed by all adherents of metaethical relativism. For example, it can be said that Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide (the intentional killing of infants) and that certain African cultures see nothing wrong with the practice of female genital mutilation, whereas Western cultures morally disapprove of these practices. We would conclude that infanticide or female genital mutilation is neither objectively right or wrong, and the morality of these actions is merely a matter of opinion which changes according to the culture an action occurs within. There is an infinite number of ways in which the parameters of this line of logic can be replicated, thus, Rachels (23) presents a general template for these arguments. It states that:

1. Different cultures have different moral codes.
2. Therefore, there is no objective “truth” in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.

This argument, which we will now refer to as the “cultural differences argument” (Ibid), should be considered logically problematic and implausible.

The reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly, the conclusion of this argument, does not follow from its premise. The premise of this argument (a) concerns what people believe, whilst its conclusion (b) concerns “what is really the case” (Ibid), a truth. These two observations are independent from each other and cannot be used to justify either statement correspondingly. This logical inconsistency, in turn reveals a major flaw in moral relativism: that this conclusion about the relativity of morality is derived purely from the fact that different cultures disagree about particular topics (Rachels 24).

Implying that disagreement alone is proof enough that objective morality does not exist. In order to demonstrate the absurdity of this claim, imagine a prominent, modern society believes that the earth is flat whilst the rest of the world believes that it is spherical. Can it be said that, “from the mere fact that people disagree” (Ibid), objective truth in geography does not exist? We would still objectively accept the shape of the earth as round and not be dissuaded simply because someone disagrees with us.  This same principle is just as applicable to ethics.

Secondly, the notion that all different moral judgements are equally valid allows for logical semantics which strike another blow against moral relativism. Whilst equal validity could suppose the validity of moral judgements, it could just as well be that both judgments are equally lacking in validity (Wellman 178).  One of the most common means to circumvent this issue is again the cultural differences argument, “that any ethical judgement is an expression of a total pattern of culture” (Ibid) and therefore valid. However, in light of the need for validity it is important to remember that ethical judgements are the result of enculturation and not reasoning, how could this then be used as a means to rationally justify the validity of one’s judgement? What these inconsistencies show is that even upon initial, quite basic investigations the problems of moral relativism are quite large – posing serious obstacles in legitimately denying objective morality. The concept of situational meaning further disproves the legitimacy of moral relativism as a genuine ethical approach.

Through the development of this analytical tool, situational meaning, we are able to see the inconsistencies of moral relativism are derived from the fact that its methodology is far too conceptually simple. The methodology is unreflective of the complex contextual fabric which constructs morality. Situational meaning refers to the notion that moral judgements are not made as if “abstract events in space-time” (Duncker 43). The meaning and judgement given to our actions are dependent on the circumstances they occur within, and cannot be taken at face value by someone unaware of them. Duncker (44) continues, emphasising that in reality “reactions are not made direct to the [action], but to the psychological situation which is a joint product of stimuli, beliefs, sentiments, etc.” Asch (376) sets out a number of specific parameters formalising the components of this psychological situation which we react against to give a particular action a moral judgement. When analysing the moral content of one’s actions, we refer to the following parameters:

1. The action in question
2. The meaning they have for the actor.
3. The evaluations and requirements that available knowledge and understanding produce.
4. The resulting action.

From this Asch denotes moral relativism only provides an interaction between (1) and (4) whilst ignoring the greater context of an action as provided by (2) and (3). Essentially, moral relativism proclaims that to derive the moral content of an action we only need to examine the action in question (1) and the resulting action this infers (4)[2]. By pointing to the “lack of constancy” (Asch 376) between actions and the reactions to them between cultures the relativist concludes that morality is relative.  The same action has created two different cultural responses. What is right and wrong is culturally dependent, leading to the further conclusion that there is no objective base to compare each moral judgement against. However, by engaging in the situational meaning of an action we actually find the opposite is true. Two different actions create the same cultural response, ergo prompting serious obstacles in nominating morality as a relative concept.

To illustrate this point we turn to the cultural practice of killing elderly parents. Whilst Western cultures undoubtedly disapprove of this, it was a practice integrated into Eskimo culture (Leighton & Hughes 329). The moral relativist would examine these contrasting moral judgements and conclude that different cultures have different moral codes, therefore there is no objective truth as right and wrong are matters of cultural opinion. However, relativist’s fatal error is she fails to assess the situational meaning of this act and wrongly assumes this disagreement (the ethical nature of murdering one’s parents) cannot be reduced to a non-moral conflict (Moody-Adams 32). Upon realising the meaning killing one’s parents may have for the actor, and in light of the knowledge and understanding available to her[3], such an action gives (in the case of the Eskimo) “the act a quality of benevolence” (Duncker 42). This act spares a parent the possibility of a slow, painful death in an incredibly unforgiving and treacherous environment whilst simultaneously permitting the survival of the community. In Eskimo culture this act was the compassionate option. In the end, there is no fundamental ethical disagreement, for each culture is actually portraying the same amicable traits and expressing them through different actions.

It becomes clear there is little to find in differences between each culture’s fundamental ethical principles. Both cultures maintain respect and love for parents, simply expressing it differently. The key tenet of moral relativism demands the same act creates different ethical valuations. However in this instance different actions create the same ethical valuation, as there is no fundamental ethical difference between them. More generally, “we do not know of societies in which bravery is despised and cowardice held up to honour, in which generosity is considered a vice and ingratitude a virtue” (Asch 378).

Moral Objectivity: An Alternative to Moral Relativism

In contrast to moral relativism is moral objectivity, a doctrine that emphasizes the existence of singular moral truths and values. Morality is an impersonal matter of fact. This section elaborates further on this doctrine, outlining the benefits objectivity has over relativity.

Moral objectivity is a doctrine that presumes the existence of moral truths independent to our own values. By being able to assert “the existence of moral facts and true moral propositions” (Brink 14), we’re able to create a moral system which serves the best interests of all communities and their respective members. Boyd (182) emphasizes the doctrine of moral objectivity[4]  is very similar to the theory and method of science and proposes the following parameters for a clear definition of this moral doctrine. By adopting moral objectivity, it is implied that:

1. Moral statements are statements which are true or false.
2. The truth or falsity of moral statements are independent of our moral opinions.
3. Ordinary canons of moral reasoning (combined with scientific and everyday factual reasoning) constitute, under most circumstances, a reliable method for obtaining and improving moral knowledge.

The concept of moral objectivity leads to the definition of actions as moral or immoral.  Rescher emphasizes the key to moral objectivity lies in the comprehension of morality as a “functional enterprise that exists for the sake of an end and purpose: to foster modes of action and interaction that facilitate the realization of human actions… that make people’s lives… more beneficial and pleasant” (395). Hence, from this definition of morality derives a method that easily determines the moral content of any given action: the moral value of an action is derived from its ability to collectively benefit (or disadvantage) total human wellbeing.

Considering this functional quality of morality, Rescher notes moral objectivity differs from moral absolutism. Absolutism is a moral doctrine that claims certain actions are alwaysimmoral regardless of the circumstances (Brink 90). Moral objectivity claims the ‘rightness’ of an act is reflective of “the act in question within a wider framework of relevant circumstances” (Rescher 396). Thus, moral objectivity is a doctrine adaptive to dynamic and complex social circumstances.

To demonstrate how important this difference is, presume a famine is taking place within a small village and one family is hoarding huge stocks of food, more than they could ever hope to consume. In response to these events a small group manages to break into the hoarders’ house and steal the stock of food, distributing it amongst the rest of the villagers and avert widespread starvation. How to morally judge this sequence of events? If the absolutist takes the act of stealing to be absolutely immoral, the action of this group would always be considered immoral regardless if countless lives were saved.

The objectivist does not follow this same dogmatic approach, as the objectivist “can insist that moral facts must vary as morally relevant circumstances vary” (Brink 91) given the purpose of moral objectivity is to assign morality to the action which maximises human wellbeing. This is a crucial distinction between moral objectivity and moral absolutism, as it shows objectivity takes morality as circumstantial, a key takeaway.

Adopting moral objectivity, not only refutes the problems or fallacies shown in moral relativism, but also avoids the frustrating inflexibilities of moral absolutism – essentially arriving at the best of both worlds.

Moral Objectivity versus Moral Relativism

Moral objectivity directly overcomes problems of moral relativism. Firstly, moral objectivity is able to legitimately criticize the abhorrent facets of history typically endorsed (at least methodologically) by moral relativism. According to the relativist the concept of ‘right’ simply means an act correlates with the cultural practices of a society, whilst ‘wrong’ implies that an action is violating them (Wellman 170). There is no other means through which we are able to morally criticise another culture as the concepts of right and wrong are culturally bound. Thus, the actions of the Nazis, apartheid or slavery are all admissible under moral relativism as moral truths derive from cultural beliefs of a society and not a standard of morality we can compare all systems against. Under moral objectivity, we regain the ability to genuinely criticize circumstances untenable for a just society.

Secondly, according to moral relativism, morality derives directly from culture. It must then be true that a single culture is homogenous not allowing for any variability of values between the many people who make up a culture, as conflicting opinions exclude the possibility of being able to articulate what is and is not moral. Do any cultures like this really exist? Such a proposal grossly oversimplifies “the possibility of internal conflict” (Moody-Adams 30) within a culture whilst simultaneously presuming it is possible for a culture to give a definitive account of what it stands for. A culture is presumed to be a singularly cohesive and homogenous social organism. Cultural conflicts historically surrounding topics such as slavery, women’s ability to vote and wars such as the Vietnam War, serve as clear reminders culture is not homogenous and conflict is a key part of its progression. By adopting moral objectivity, the problem of morality is no longer bound to culture. Each act is judged independently according to an objective scale of morality.

Works Cited

Asch, Solomon. “The Fact of Culture and the Problem of Relativism,” in Social Psychology. Prentice Hall, New York. 1952.

Boyd, Richard. “How to Be a Moral Realist,” in Moral Realism, edited by Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. Cornell University Press, Cornell, 1988.

Brink, David. Moral Realism and The Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

Duncker, Karl. “Ethical Relativity? (An Enquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics).” Mind, vol. 48, no. 189, 1939, pp. 39-57.

Leighton, Alexander, Hughes, Charles. “Notes on Eskimo Patterns of Suicide.” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, vol. 11, no. 4, 1955, pp. 327-338.

Levy, Neil. Moral Relativism: A Short Introduction. Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 2002.

Moody-Adams, Michele. “The Empirical Underdetermination of Descriptive Cultural Relativism,” in Fieldwork in Familiar Places. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1997.

Moser, Paul, Carson, Thomas. “Introduction,” in Moral Relativism: A Reader, edited by Moser, Paul, Carson, Thomas. Oxford University Press, UK, 2001.

Rachels, James. “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,” in The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Random House, New York, 1999.

Rescher, Nicholas. “Moral Objectivity.” Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 25, no. 1, 2008, pp. 393-409.

Seven Pillars Institute. “Moral Relativism,” Seven Pillars Institute, 26 August 2017, https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/glossary/moral-relativism/.

Wellman, Carl. “The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 55, 1963, pp. 169-184.

[1]SPI (1)

[2]Whereby this resulting action expresses the cultural (im)permissibility of the original action.

[3]Points (b) and (c) of Asch’s parameters for moral judgement.

[4]Referred to as ‘Moral Realism’ in his text, these terms are interchangeable.