Punishment

In response to the wrongdoing of an individual, or group, a deliberate penalty is often imposed by an individual or institution (such as a family, church, corporation, or state).  The penalty often involves the infliction of harm – or some degree of unpleasantness – upon the wrongdoer.

As ‘do not harm’ is a central principle of most all ethical theories, the practice of punishment calls for serious philosophical justification.

Traditionally, punishment has been understood as a retributive practice, based on concepts of fairness or justice.   Thus, a wrongdoer gets his punishment ‘because he deserves it.’

Utilitarians reject this justification on the grounds that it inflicts more suffering (the harm done to the wrongdoer) than it brings about happiness (the pleasure, for others, of seeing justice fulfilled).  In most cases, then, it seems that retributive justice does not meet the utilitarian requirement for morally right action.

Nevertheless, utilitarians do not reject punishment outright on these grounds.  Rather, they hold that punishment is justified when it is beneficial to society, that is, when it brings about the greatest good for society.  Thus, if punishment effectively reduces crime by deterring wrongdoing, by reforming wrongdoers, or by keeping wrongdoers out of society, then the utilitarian will find punishment justifiable.

In discussions of punishment and its justification, questions regarding the appropriate degree and duration of punishment also arise.  In other words, ‘what is fair?’ or ‘what is a fair punishment?’ is also an important question, and one which again highlights the connection between punishment and justice.