Justice, Circumstances of
John Rawls describes the circumstances of justice as “the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.”1 Unless the circumstances of justice are met by the society in question, using justice as fairness to derive just social policies is a misapplication of the theory because human cooperation, a necessary staple of a functional and just society, cannot be properly established. Rawls identifies two distinct kinds of background conditions that must be met to give rise to justice (as he conceives it): objective circumstances and subjective circumstances.
Objective circumstances are those concerning the natural state of the society. Its inhabitants must coexist in some clearly identifiable territory and be of comparable strength and intelligence such that no individual can dominate all the others. Perhaps the most crucial objective circumstance of justice is that the resources available to the society be moderately scarce. Rawls states that justice can only arise when “[n]atural and other resources are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation are superfluous, nor are conditions so harsh that fruitful ventures must inevitably break down.”2 When resources are so plentiful that anyone can have what he or she desires without the assistance of others, social cooperation is unnecessary. On the other hand, when resources are too scarce for everyone to fulfill even their minimal desires (i.e., when no surplus can be generated from the resources available), social cooperation is undermined because its benefits will always fail to satisfy people’s demands.
Subjective circumstances are those pertaining to the individuals in the society and their cooperation. Individuals must have competing interests which cause them to all lay different claims to the resources available. When these competing interests come into conflict with mutually advantageous social cooperation, a need for the concept of justice arises.
- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 109.
- Ibid., 110.